ER PAGE 554; TOWNSEND VS BISHOP (1939) 1 ALL ER PAGE 805 AND CARL ZEISS STIFTUNG VS
RAYNER AND KEELER LIMITED (No 2) (1967) 1 AC PAGE 853
As regards the contention that Issue Estoppel applies to Criminal Trials, SARKAR LAW OF
EVIDENCE, SEVENTH EDITION, VOLUME 2 commented on Issue Estoppel out of a Criminal Verdict
and stated that Issue Estoppel in a Criminal Matter has a different foundation to be looked at. The
burden lies specifically on the Person who holds and who wants to take shelter of the Principle of
Estoppel. The requirement is that both the Proceedings should necessarily be Criminal Proceedings.
Even when the issues are identical, differences in the onus of proof may sometimes prevent an
estoppel from arising, so Civil Proceedings are not necessarily estopped by an acquittal in respect of
the same matter.
As regards, re-using of Evidential Material in Previous Decisions in Acquittal, is the case of
SAMBASIVAM VS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF MALAYA, FEDERATION OF MALAYA (1950) AC PAGE
458, where the Prosecution relied on a Statement purporting to be the Defendant’s but which the
Defendant denied making, which contained an admission of the offence for which he was being tried
for carrying a firearm and an admission of an offence of which he had, in different proceedings, been
acquitted for possessing ammunition. The conviction was quashed because the Assessors who tried
the case had not been told that the Prosecution could not ask the Court to accept a substantial and
important part of what it said, namely that the Defendant had committed the offence of which he had
previously been acquitted. Lord McDermott delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee stated
that, “The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court on a lawful charge and after a
lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the Person acquitted cannot be tried again for the
same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent
proceedings between parties to the adjudication.”
The House of Lords reconsidered this principle of law enunciated in Sambasivam’s Case in the case
of R VS Z (2000) 2 AC PAGE 483 and concluded that this above decision of Lord McDermott
required qualification in order to confine its application to its proper context. The Principle of Double
Jeopardy prevents a man, in the absence of Special Circumstances, from being prosecuted a second
time on the same or substantially the same facts as have given rise to an Earlier Prosecution, which
resulted either in his Acquittal or Conviction. An attempt to pursue a Prosecution in breach of this
Principle of Double Jeopardy will justify a Plea of Autrefois Acquit or Autrefois Convict, or an
Application to Stay the Proceedings as an Abuse Of Process. However, provided the Defendant is not
placed in Double Jeopardy in this sense, evidence that is relevant to a Particular Charge is not
rendered inadmissible simply because it shows that the Defendant was in fact, Guilty of an Offence of
which he had previously been Acquitted. The Admission of such evidence would not infringe the Rule
against Double Jeopardy because it would not put the Defendant in peril of Conviction in respect of
the Charges of which he had been acquitted.
In the case of CONNELLY VS DPP (1964) AC PAGE 1254, 1356f, Three of the Law Lords expressed
the opinion that Issue Estoppel would be applicable on appropriate facts in an English Criminal Case.
Lord Delvin thought that this would be undesirable if only because of the difficulty of ascertaining
what precise issues are determined in Criminal Proceedings in which there are no Pleadings, nothing
but a General Verdict of a Jury and no reasoned Judgments. In R VS HOGAN (1974) QB PAGE 398; 2
ALL ER PAGE 142, a case in which it was possible to ascertain what issues had been determined by
the Jury at the first trial. Hogan had unsuccessfully relied on self-defence in answer to a charge of
causing grievous bodily harm with intent to produce that result. He was then charged with murder
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