Amendments, the Nigerian Penal Code and the Indian Penal Code are still virtually the same, and Nigerian Cases have followed the Precedent in India. In Reply on Points of Law, Learned Silk representing the Defendant submitted that the Prosecution did not adequately respond to the Crux of their Submission on this issue but rather submitted that notwithstanding the Provision of Section 311 of the Penal Code, there is no need to expressly include the element of dishonestly in the Charge, as same has been subsumed in the technical words ‘Criminal Breach of Trust’. The position of the Prosecution is contrary to all known Rules relating to Drafting of Charges as well as the Constitutional Provision that anyone charged with a Criminal Offence must be informed of the Offence in clear terms. Referring to Section 36 (6) (a)-(e) of the 1999 Constitution, he told the Court that it is clear that Dishonestly is not only an essential element of the Offence under consideration, but the Law requires same to be expressly stated while framing the Charge. The Failure to do so leaves the Court with no other option than to declare those Counts invalid and same ought to be quashed. Emphasis has always been on the ingredients of the Offence, as they exist in the Statute and not on the interpretation of what the Prosecution makes of the Element of the Offence. To buttress his point, he relied on the cases of YAKUBU IBRAHIM VS COP (2010) LPELR-CA/A/6C/2017 (CA) PP 17-18 PARAS E-B; THEOPHILLUS ONUOHA VS THE STATE (1988) NWLR (PT 83) 460; IBRAHIM AND ORS VS COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (2010) LPELR 8984 (CA); AKWULE VS THE QUEEN (1963) NNLR PAGE 105; CAPTAIN ABIDOYE VS FRN (2013) 12 SC PART 1 PAGE 99 AT PAGE 119 PARAS 25-30. Learned Silk, argued that even the Prosecution agreed with their position, when he submitted that, once the Count contains the technical words, it would be said to have taken into consideration that the act is dishonest as defined in Section 311 of the Penal Code in its entirety, which is to say that from this definition, to commit Crime Breach of Trust meant to dishonestly misappropriate, convert, use or dispose off Property. According to him, it is not the intention of the Draftsman that the word “dishonesty” be hidden or subsumed under any technical word. He urged the Court to discountenance the arguments of the Prosecution on this issue and hold that the failure to state all the essential elements of the Offence in accordance with binding Judicial Authorities on this issue is fatal and therefore, Counts 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,10,13,15,17,19,21 and 23 should be quashed. In addition, Learned Silk also contended that there was no basis for the Prosecution to resort to the Indian Penal Code’s definition of Criminal Breach of Trust, when there are well-covered definitions in Supreme Court decisions, which are followed by the Court of Appeal, and which decisions by Rules of Precedence also known as Rules of Judicial Discipline, are binding on Lower Courts. Moreover, it is assumed that the Apex Court knew of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, when it prescribed that the elements of the Offence of Criminal Breach of Trust, including dishonesty were to be specified in the Charge. Therefore, reliance by the Prosecution on Indian Penal Code or decisions is a clear admission that the decisions of the Apex Courts do not support the contention of the Prosecution and he urged the Court not to look to foreign jurisdictions for guidance when there are Nigerian Case Law Authorities. Learned Silk argued as untrue the submission that Nigerian Case Law follow Indian Precedence, citing the NUHU VS DSS KWARA STATE COMMAND (2017) LPELR-4235 (CA); OKON & ORS VS THE STATE (1988) 1 NWLR PART 69 PAGE 172; (1988) ALL NLR PAGE 173; (1988) 2 SC PAGE 140; ARAKA VS EGBUE (2003) 17 NWLR PART 848 PAGE 1; PFIZER SPECIALITIES LTD VS CHYZOB PHARMACY LTD (2008) ALL FWLR PART 414 PAGE 1455 AT PAGE 1489 PARAS E-G, to say Foreign Legislations and Decisions are persuasive in nature, but they cannot supplant Nigerian 33