proving the offences for which the defendant is charged beyond reasonable doubt.” The above issue raised by the prosecution captures the crux of the issue that the court will shortly resolve. I have carefully considered the charge in this matter, the evidence adduced by parties and the written address filed by the learned counsel to the prosecution herein to which I may refer to in the course of this judgment where necessary. It seems to me that the single issue for determination in this matter and which requires the most circumspect of consideration is whether the prosecution has proved the charge against the defendant beyond reasonable doubt to warrant a conviction for the offences charged. Now, it is not a matter for dispute that the charge defendant is facing involves the alleged commission of crimes. Under our criminal justice system and here all parties are in agreement, the burden or onus is clearly on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt. See Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act. The position of the law, as provided for by Section 135(2) and (3) of the Evidence Act, needs restatement, that the burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is, subject to Section 139 of the Act, on the person who asserts it; and that if the prosecution proves the commission of a crime beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of proving reasonable doubt is shifted on to the Accused person. In shedding more light on the statutory responsibility and expectation of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court held in Mufutau Bakare V. The state (1987)3 SC 1 at 32, per Oputa, JSC (now late) as follows: “Proof beyond reasonable doubt stems out of a compelling presumption of innocence inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice. To displace this presumption, the evidence of the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond the shadow of any doubt that the person accused is guilty of the offence charged. Absolute certainty is impossible in any human adventure including the ministration of criminal justice.” See also Lortim V. State (1997)2 N.W.L.R (pt.490)711 at 732; Okere V. The State (2001)2 N.W.L.R (pt.697)397 at 415 to 416; Emenegor V. State (2009)31 W.R.N 73; Nwaturuocha V. The State (2011)6 N.W.L.R (pt.1242)170. 9