him for which she gave him the C of O of her property as security. She stated categorically in the statement that she did not sell her property to Amasi Okon and that she attempted to repay the loan by making a part payment of Ten Million Naira which Amasi Okon refused to collect from her but insisted on full payment. The particulars of the offence of Count one of the charge is that the defendant sold a property to Amasi Okon under the false pretence that she owned same. The false pretence alleged is that she sold a property allegedly owned by her under the pretence that it belonged to her. In the case of FARO VS. I.G.P (1964) LEPLR 25223 (SC), Brett JSC held as follows: “It is well established that if there is a difference in substance between the pretence alleged in the charge and the pretence by means of which the property was obtained an accused person is entitled to be acquitted, and in deciding whether such a difference exists, what the Courts have to do is to compare the substance of the pretence alleged with that of the operative pretence.” I have found earlier that the prosecution did not give any evidence in support of Count one of the charge except Exhibit 9 which I have held cannot be relied upon as proof of the offence. The statement of the defendant is that she took a loan from Amasi Okon. She denied selling a property to him as alleged in the charge. The statement of the defendant is not an admission of the commission of the offence alleged in Count one of the charge and I so hold. In the circumstance, I find the prosecution has failed to establish the offence of obtaining by false pretence contrary to Section 1(1)(a) of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act 2006 beyond reasonable doubt and I so hold. 15