Now, let us preface our consideration of this matter by restating the obvious that our adversary criminal justice system is accusatorial in nature and substance, and every person charged with a criminal offence is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. See s. 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). A necessary corollary of the presumption of innocence is that in a criminal trial such as the present, the burden is always on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Quite unlike civil proceedings, this burden on the prosecution is static and never shifts to the accused. It is if, and only if, the prosecution succeeds in proving the commission of a crime beyond reasonable doubt that the burden of establishing that reasonable doubt exists shifts to the accused. See ss. 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act 2011. The Prosecution has the unenviable burden of proving all the material ingredients of the offence(s) charged beyond reasonable doubt. See STATE v. SADU [2001] 33 WRN 21 at 40, SHEKETE v. N.A.F [2007] 14 NWLR (PT. 1053) 159, IORTIM v. STATE [1997] 2 NWLR (PT. 490) 711 at 732G-H; KALU v. STATE [1998] 13 NWLR (PT. 583) 531 and UDO v. STATE (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 337) 456 at 457. Where the prosecution fails to do so, the charge is not made out and the court is bound to record a verdict discharging and acquitting the accused. See MAJEKODUNMI v THE NIGERIAN ARMY [2002] 31 WRN 138 at 147. Also, if on the totality of the evidence adduced the court were left in a state of doubt or uncertainty, the prosecution would have failed to discharge the onus of proof cast upon it by law and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal. See UKPE v STATE [2001] 18 WRN 84 at 105. However, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond every shadow of doubt, but such proof as would reasonably and/or irresistibly lead to the inference that the accused committed the offence. See AKINYEMI v STATE [1996] 6 NWLR (PT 607) 449, ONI v 15 | P a g e