to the entire Charge Sheet. A Charge (that is, each Count) must therefore be free from ambiguity, must be certain and should contain as follows: • The Offence for which the Defendant is Charged; • The Written Law and the Section of the Written Law against which the Offence is said to have been committed; • Particulars of the date and place where the Offence was allegedly committed; • The Person against whom or thing, if any, in respect of which the Offence was committed; and • The name of the Defendant. The effect of an Ambiguous Charge will always depend on whether the Ambiguity was sufficient to mislead the Defendant, to the extent that he did not know the offence for which he is being tried, and the Defendant must know clearly why he is before the Court. This Rule unlike other Rules is rigid and inflexible, and admits of no exception. However, because the Purpose of the Rules is to give a Defendant adequate notice of the Charge against him, not all defects or ambiguities will nullify a Trial. Consequently, in cases where the errors or omissions are Minor or merely Technical, the Courts have refrained from nullifying the Charges only because of the said errors or omissions. In OGBOMOR VS THE STATE (1985) 2 S. C 289; 1 NSCC PAGE 224 AT PAGES 233, 234, the accused Person was charged before the Robbery and Firearms tribunal with armed robbery contrary to the Robbery and Firearms Act 1970. He was convicted. On appeal against conviction, it was contended that the accused was charged for an offence unknown to law because there is no Statute known as the Robbery and Firearms Act 1970. The Supreme Court held that mere misdescription of the Robbery and Firearms Act 1970 was minor and technical as the accused knew under which Statute he was being tried. Therefore the Defendant was not prejudiced by the defect in the Charge and the Appeal was dismissed. Under no circumstances should a Charge be ambiguous. In the case of OKEKE & ANOR VS INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (1965) 2 ALL NLR 81, where the Defendant was charged with the Offences of Conspiracy and Stealing, the Trial Magistrate convicted him of both Offences and stated in the Judgment Book that the Defendant was charged under some Sections of the ‘Criminal Acts’. On Appeal against Conviction, on the ground that the Charge was bad for ambiguity, it was held that as the Sections of the Enactment contravened by the Defendant were not stated in The Trial Magistrate’s Judgment, and as there were no Enactments known as the ‘Criminal Acts’, the Charge contravened Section 151(3) of the CPA, which provides that the Written Law and the Section of the Written Law against which the Offence is alleged to have contravened shall be set out in the Charge. Thus, the Appeal was allowed. However, it is noted that the circumstances of this Case is different from the fact of an Omission of words in a Charge. As the whole essence of this Rule is to give a Defendant notice of the Charge against him, some errors on the part of the Prosecution will not essentially invalidate the Charge or lead the Court to set aside any Conviction based on the Charge. Further reference is made to the cases of DURU VS THE POLICE (1960) L.L.R 130; OGBOMOR VS THE STATE (1985) 1 NWLR 223; OGBUDU VS THE STATE (1987) 3 S.C. 497; SUGH VS THE STATE (1988) NWLR 475. It is also important to note that in a Trial by Information, the Prosecution has a Constitutional Duty under Section 36(6)(a) and (b) and 12 of the 1999 Constitution (As Amended) and a Statutory Duty under Section 185(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code and Rules 3(2) and (4) of the Criminal Procedure (Application for Leave to Prefer a Charge in the High Court) Rules, 1970, which became operational on the 1st Day of April 1970, to provide the Defendant, in advance of 36