he and/or the 2nd defendant had a joint venture agreement with Kabiat Construction Company or that the original allottee of the plot is General Procurement Services. In his reply on points of law, Mr. Osuwa argued that the submission of prosecuting counsel on the non-existence of the estate “was based on suspicion and doubt”. He cited Onah v. State [1985] 2 NWLR [Pt. 12] 236 and Ahmed v. State [2002] FWLR [Pt. 90] 1358 to support the principle that suspicion cannot take the place of legal proof. With due respect, I reject this submission. As I had said, the facts before the Court do not show that the defendants had any land to develop and/or sell as at the date of their transaction with PW1. Section 17 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act defines “false pretence” as “a representation, whether deliberate or reckless, made by word, in writing or by conduct, of a matter of fact or law, either past or present, which representation is false in fact or law, and which the person making it knows to be false or does not believe to be true”. See Uzoka v. F.R.N. [2009] LPELR4950[CA]. From all that I have said, I hold that the representation made by the defendants to the PW1 that they had a plot of land to sell was a false pretence; and the defendants knew that it was false. The defendants, by false pretence, induced or made PW1 to transfer his money to them; and the money paid is capable of being stolen. I hold the humble view that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the first, second, third, fourth and sixth elements of the offence charged. In respect of the fifth ingredient, learned defence counsel pointed out that Corporate Affairs Commission confirmed that the 2nd defendant was duly 14