"It is settled law that the evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value thereto reside within the province of the trial court that saw, heard and assessed the witnesses and that where a trial court unquestionable evaluates the evidence and justifiably appraises the facts, it is not the business of the appellate court to substitute its own views for the view of the trial court but the court can intervene where there is insufficient evidence to sustain the judgment, or where the trial court fails to make proper use of the opportunity of seeing, hearing and observing the witnesses or where the findings of fact of the trial court cannot be regarded as resulting from the evidence or where the trial court has drawn wrong conclusion from accepted evidence or has taken an erroneous view of the evidence adduced before it or its findings are perverse in the sense that they do not flow from accepted evidence or are not supported by evidence before the court." See also Adimora v. Aiufo (1983) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 1; Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 360; Are v. Ipaye (1990) NWLR (Pt. 132) 298; Elohor v. Osayade (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 524. The suboptimal findings of the learned trial judge are perverse and are not supported by the evidence before the court. The circumstantial evidence: CA/L/629/2014 1. That the bills of lading and the sum of N300, 000.00 were given to PW10 by the appellant to proceed with the clearance of the containers; 2. That the appellant had in his house documents showing he had applied for a visa to Bolivia and was rejected; 3. That the co-accused proceeded to forge the documents of Efcrisam Group to enable him obtain from Ellisbonav the necessary documents for the clearance of the containers do not point to one and only one rational conclusion, the guilt of the accused. They can be explained on other grounds. There were flaws and unexplained gaps in the evidence presented by the prosecution leaving doubts as to the guilt of the appellant. Further, vital witnesses whose positions were not so different from that of the appellant and particularly the 2nd accused (who if indeed there was a case to answer ought to have been charged along with the accused persons) were not even called to give evidence. The doubts created by these gaps in the case of the prosecution must be resolved in favour of the appellant. The prosecution did not prove the case on the standard required by law. It did not prove beyond reasonable doubt the alleged conspiracy between the appellant and the 2nd accused and that the appellant was involved in the importation of 165 Kg of cocaine from Bolivia using container MSCU 1287231. I hold that this appeal has merit. It is hereby allowed. The judgment of the lower court is set aside. The appellant is discharged and acquitted.