I r,!€hBl-+1F6'ir!n{.:..M i.. i satisfied this duty by irstablishing all the ingreclients set by law for such offence. Where a reasonable doubt exists, such doupt must be resolved in favour of the accused. usruan Q021) 'LPEtR-ss20z See ,Sra te v. (sc) pp. z7-zg, paras. D-tr; (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt.l80l) 73, see also yongo v, c.o.p.(Lggz) l 8 ,i, NWLR (Pt.25:t). 36; Idi ,v; stute (2017) LPELR -4zss7(sc), (2018) 4 NWLR Gw angw (Pt. 1610) an (2015) LPEL F.-Z 4837 (SC), (Pt.1477) 600.. 359; State v. (2015) tri I''\\'[ ]t ., .,1 I must quickly add here that the duty on the prosecution to prove the guilt of an accusedr person beyond reasonable doubt does not amount to prove beyond all shadow of doubt. "r* Jua v. state (2010) l-,prctrn -rc37 (sc) pp. 20- zl, paras. Ei. A, (2010) 4 NwLR(Pt. 11s4) zt7, this court per Niki robi, : JSC (of blessed memory) stated the law as follows: -i:,' "while our adjectival law places on the prosecution the duty to proye a criminal case beyond all reasonable doubt, the prosecution has not the duty to prove the . c?se beyond aII, s,hadow of doubt. shadows of doubt n-l could''be reflected in tfie case of the prosec-ution but that cannot in law s top or inhibit conviction. The court can nvict an accused person the moment the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt. And here, the 16 G